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It remains clear that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in 
favor of Defendant / Appellee Summit Financial Resources, L.P. ("Summit"). Summit, 
in its Brief, has failed to offer a cogent argument that casts any doubt on the correctness 
of the following conclusions: (1) a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that Summit 
failed to satisfy its obligation under the terms of the parties' written Employment 
Agreement to pay full bonuses to Mr. Carvelas in 2000 and 2001; (2) a reasonable finder 
of fact could conclude, either by consideration of extrinsic evidence as to the parties' 
intent or by application of implied-in-fact contract principles, that Summit failed to 
satisfy its obligation to pay him a bonus in 2004; and (3) a reasonable finder of fact 
could conclude that Summit breached the Employment Agreement by failing to satisfy 
the procedural requirements set forth in their Employment Agreement for terminating an 
employee without cause. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A REASONABLE FINDER OF FACT COULD CONCLUDE THAT 
SUMMIT BREACHED ITS WRITTEN CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
WITH MR. CARVELAS BY FAILING TO PAY HIM FULL BONUSES IN 
2000 AND 2001. 
Summit asserts (Brief at pp. 12-20)1 that the Employment Agreement 
unambiguously vested sole authority to pay bonuses in the Chief Executive Officer 
("CEO"), Gordon LaHaye, that Summit met its obligation to pay bonuses in 2000 and 
2001 because the CEO determined that no one, including Mr. Carvelas, met their goals 
1
 Citations in this form refer to the Brief of Appellee Summit Financial Resources, 
L.P. reflected on the Court's docket as having been filed on April 24, 2006. 
1 
and objectives for those years, and that Mr. Carvelas has presented no evidence 
establishing a dispute of material fact as to whether the CEO actually made this 
determination. Summit is wrong on each point. As we made clear in our principal Brief 
(at pp. 14-19) and confirm again below in responding to each contention raised by 
Summit, (A) the failure to establish any initial goals and objectives precluded 
Mr. LaHaye from reviewing, modifying, or amending any such goals and objectives; 
and, therefore, from making a determination whether Mr. Carvelas met them; (B) the 
failure of Mr. LaHaye to ever conduct a formal review of Mr. Carvelas required 
Summit, by operation of the language of Exhibit B, to pay full bonuses in each year; and 
(C) even if Mr. LaHaye had sole discretion to establish goals and objectives and 
determine whether Mr. Carvelas met them, there exists a factual dispute whether he ever 
established any goals and objectives on which to base a determination. 
A. The Failure to Establish Any Initial Goals and Objectives Precluded 
Mr. LaHaye From Ever Reviewing, Modifying, or Amending Any Such 
Goals and Objectives, and, Therefore, from Making a Determination 
Whether Mr. Carvelas Met Them. 
Summit asserts (Brief at pp. 14-15) that the payment of bonuses was within the 
CEO's sole discretion because the payment of such bonuses was contingent upon the 
CEO's determination whether Mr. Carvelas had met his goals and objectives, which, 
Summit says, were also within the CEO's sole direction. Yet, the Employment 
Agreement simply does not provide either that the establishment of goals and objectives 
or the decision whether to pay bonuses are solely within the CEO's discretion. Rather, 
as we made clear in our principal Brief (at pp. 14-15), the Agreement and Exhibit B to 
2 
the Agreement provide that the parties, by mutual agreement, must establish an initial 
set of goals and objectives; and then the CEO may revise, modify, or amend that initial 
set of goals and objectives. See Rec. at 89 (Employment Agreement at p. 2, f 4.2); Rec. 
at 88 (Employment Agreement at p. 1,13). Summit, however, fails to address (see 
Brief at pp. 12-20) the argument that we made in our principal Brief (at pp. 14-15) that 
the failure to establish any initial goals and objectives necessarily precluded Mr. LaHaye 
from ever revising, modifying or amending any such goals and objectives. Mr. LaHaye 
simply had no power under the Agreement to revise, modify, or amend something that 
never existed. As a consequence, a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that no 
actual goals and objectives ever existed and, therefore, that the assertion by Mr. LaHaye 
that Mr. Carvelas failed to meet them is a mere fabrication to rationalize a failure to pay 
bonuses that was not authorized by the Agreement. 
B. The Failure of Mr. LaHaye to Ever Conduct a Formal Review of 
Mr. Carvelas Required Summit, By Operation of the Language of 
Exhibit B} to Pay Full Bonuses in Each Year. 
Summit argues (Brief at pp. 16-17) that a reasonable finder of fact, as an 
alternative to the conclusion noted above, could not make the determination that the 
parties intended all of the language of Exhibit B to apply to the annual payment of 
bonuses, not just impose a requirement that the parties establish an initial set of goals 
and objectives. In support of this contention, Summit asserts (Brief at pp. 16-17), 
without explanation, that such a reading of the Employment Agreement is "neither 
plausible nor reasonable [and] ... would require the Court to 'read in5 significant 
3 
contrary language - something the Court cannot do." Yet, as we made clear in our 
principal Brief (at pp. 15-17), the actual language of paragraphs 3 and 4.2 of the 
Employment Agreement - which specifically makes Exhibit B applicable to the 
payment of bonuses in 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002, not merely to 1999 - belies 
Summit's assertion. Indeed, Summit's reading of the applicability of Exhibit B, which 
renders it applicable only to 1999, thus conflicts with the actual language of those 
paragraphs. Therefore, given this ambiguity, a reasonable jury would be fully justified 
in concluding that Exhibit B tells us what happens when, as here, Mr. Carvelas was 
never given a review throughout the course of his employment; and that, in such a case, 
he would be deemed to have met his goals and objectives by operation of the language 
of Exhibit B. See, e.g., Fairbourn Commercial Inc. v. Am. Hous. Prtnrs, Inc., 2004 UT 
54, f 10, 94 P.3d 292 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
C. Even if Mr. LaHaye Had Sole Discretion to Establish Goals and 
Objectives and Determine Whether Mr. Carvelas Met Them, There 
Exists a Factual Dispute as to Whether He Ever Established Any Goals 
and Objectives On Which to Base Such a Determination. 
Summit asserts (Brief at pp. 17-20) that the fact that Mr. LaHaye made the 
determination that Mr. Carvelas had not met the goals and objectives established by 
Mr. LaHaye is undisputed. In particular, Summit asserts (Brief at pp. 17-18) that 
Mr. Carvelas has claimed only that he was not informed of his goals and objectives and 
(Brief at pp. 18-19) that Mr. Carvelas has proffered no evidence to cast doubt on the 
assertion that Mr. LaHaye actually made the determination that Mr. Carvelas had met 
them. Yet, the only evidence offered by Summit that any goals and objectives ever 
4 
existed, or that Mr. Carvelas failed to meet them, is the post-lawsuit assertion by 
Mr. LaHaye. In reality, Summit's failure to produce any evidence whatsoever that 
showed either the existence of any goals or objectives or Mr. Carvelas5 failure to meet 
them that existed prior to the filing of Summit's motion for summary judgment -
together with the failure ever to give Mr. Carvelas a review of any sort or inform him of 
his goals and objectives - supports a reasonable inference now that no such evidence 
exists and that Mr. LaHaye's newly-minted assertion is merely a fabrication that is not 
worthy of being believed. See, e.g., Pry or v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geralds on, 
212 F.3d 976, 979-80 (7th Cir. 2000); Fisher v. Pharmacis & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 
921-22 (8th Cir. 2000); Cicero v. Borg-Warner Automotive, Inc., 280 F.3d 579, 589-93 
(6th Cir. 2001). 
Finally, contrary to Summits contention (Brief at pp. 19-20), Summit's motion 
for summary judgment - filed when no discovery had been conducted and decided after 
Summit had declined to participate in any discovery - was clearly premature. Even if 
Summit had actually presented even a modicum of evidence beyond Mr. LaHaye's post-
lawsuit assertion showing either the existence of goals and objectives or that 
Mr. Carvelas failed to meet them, Summit's motion for summary judgment was not the 
appropriate avenue by which to resolve the factual question whether Mr. Carvelas met 
those goals, even in Mr. LaHaye's mind. The fact that Mr. LaHaye had, as Summit sees 
it, "sole discretion" to decide whether Mr. Carvelas met those goals and objectives (if 
they ever existed) does not mean that he actually exercised that discretion. In fact, 
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without the opportunity to conduct such discovery, we cannot say now whether a 
reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. LaHaye's assertion is credible (even though, as 
we note above, there is ample evidence to support a conclusion that it is not). See, e.g., 
Fisher, 225 F.3d at 921-22; Cicero, 280 F.3d at 589-93.2 If, following discovery, 
Summit still produces nothing in support of Mr. LaHaye's assertion, that assertion be 
entirely unbelievable. As it stands now, Mr. LaHaye's assertion is merely one, when 
considered in light of Summit's failure to produce any pre-lawsuit evidence that 
supports it, a statement that a reasonable jury could find not worthy of being believed. 
2
 Summit, for its part, contends (Brief at pp. 19-20) that the issue of the District 
Court's decision to grant Summit's motion for summary judgment without the benefit of 
any discovery is not properly before this Court because, Summit says, "if [Mr.] Carvelas 
truly felt that discovery was needed, he could have made a Rule 56(f) motion to request 
such discovery." Summit's reliance on Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
however, is misplaced. That Rule provides that, if it appears from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the moving party is unable to support the motion by way of 
affidavit, the court may deny the motion or allow a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). Such a 
situation was not presented here. Moreover, in his Memorandum in opposition to Summit's 
motion, Mr. Carvelas argued that the motion should be denied for all of the very reasons 
set forth above, including the fact Summit had filed its motion prior to any discovery having 
occurred at all. See Rec. at 81. As a consequence, it is difficult to see how, as Summit 
asserts, the issue of the District Court's decision to grant the motion for summary judgment 
without the benefit of any discovery is not properly before this Court 
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II. A REASONABLE FINDER OF FACT COULD CONCLUDE, EITHER BY 
CONSIDERATION OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OR IMPLIED-IN-FACT 
CONTRACT PRINCIPLES, THAT SUMMIT BREACHED ITS 
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT WITH MR. CARVELAS BY FAILING 
TO PAY HIM A BONUS IN 2004. 
Summit contends (Brief at pp. 20-30) that, because the Employment Agreement 
clearly and unambiguously (according to Summit) provided for no bonuses to be paid 
after 2002, Summit was not obligated to pay Mr. Carvelas a bonus in 2004. Yet, the 
Agreement is merely silent on the question whether bonuses would be paid after 2002, 
which is not, despite Summit's best efforts to make it so, the equivalent of a prohibition. 
In reality, by stating nothing at all concerning the payment of bonuses after 2002, the 
Agreement creates an ambiguity that cannot be resolved solely by looking to the four 
corners of the Agreement itself. See, e.g., Fairbourn, 2004 UT 54, Tf 10, 34 P.3d at 295; 
Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2000 UT 37, ffl 8-10, 78 P.3d 600, 602-03 (Utah 2003). 
Therefore, as we made clear in our principal Brief (at pp. 19-28) and confirm below in 
responding to the assertions raised by Summit, we may, in resolving this ambiguity, 
properly rely (A) on extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent at the time they 
entered into the Employment Agreement; or (B) alternatively, on implied-in-fact 
contract principles to give effect to the intention manifested by the parties' after the 
specific provisions of the Agreement were no longer operable. 
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A. Extrinsic Evidence Establishes that the Parties Intended that the 
Payment of Bonuses Would Continue Beyond 2002 Based on the 
Methodology Set Forth in the Employment Agreement. 
Summit contends (Brief at pp. 25-27) that the issue of whether the Employment 
Agreement was integrated on the payment of bonuses beyond 2002 is not properly 
before this Court on appeal; and that Mr. Carvelas cannot overcome the presumption of 
integration because he has offered no extrinsic evidence regarding the parties' intent at 
the time of contracting beyond his allegation that he understood he would receive 
bonuses after 2002. As we show below, however, (1) the issue of whether the 
Agreement was integrated on that issue was raised before the District Court; (2) the 
record shows that the Agreement was not integrated on that issue; and (3) extrinsic 
evidence helps resolve the ambiguity whether bonuses would be paid beyond 2002. 
1. The Issue of Whether the Contract Was Integrated Was Raised 
Before the Trial Court by Summit. 
Summit misstates Mr. Carvelas' argument when it says (Brief at p. 26) that we 
contend that the "Integration and Modification Provisions of the Employment 
Agreement create a factual issue as to whether the Employment Agreement is fully 
integrated on the question of post-2002 bonuses, and that therefore the Court should 
consider his 'extrinsic evidence' of conversations regarding bonuses to clear up the 
resultant ambiguities." Rather, in our principal Brief (at pp. 20-25), we argued that this 
Court should consider extrinsic parol evidence on the issue of whether the parties 
intended bonuses to continue beyond 2002 because the Employment Agreement, by its 
silence on that issue, is ambiguous. We do not argue, as Summit seems to suggest, that 
8 
the integration and modification clauses of the Employment Agreement create that 
ambiguity. 
The issue of whether the Agreement is integrated, in turn, was presented in our 
principal Brief merely because Mr. Carvelas anticipated that Summit, as it did below 
and does now (Brief at pp. 26-27), would assert that parol evidence was not admissible 
because the Employment Agreement is integrated as a final and complete expression of 
the parties' agreement on that issue. Summit is thus wrong when it asserts (Brief at 
p. 27) that Mr. Carvelas has raised the issue of integration for the first time on appeal. 
To the contrary, Mr. Carvelas argued below in its Memorandum (Rec. at 82-83), as he 
does now, that extrinsic parol evidence in the form of Mr. Carvelas' testimony as to the 
parties' original intent at the time they entered into the Agreement was admissible to 
prove whether the parties intended, by the Agreement itself, to require bonuses to be 
paid beyond 2002. Then, Summit, in its Reply Memorandum below (Rec. at 118) 
asserted, as it does now, that "the agreement specifically invalidates any supposed 
representations prior to or contemporaneous with the agreement," reciting the language 
of the integration clause set forth in the Employment Agreement. Accordingly, in his 
principal Brief on appeal before this Court, Mr. Carvelas merely addressed, 
preemptively, the argument that the Employment Agreement is integrated on the issue 
of the payment of bonuses beyond 2002 that Summit raised below in response to our 
argument below that the trial court should consider extrinsic evidence on that issue. 
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2. The Employment Agreement Was Not Integrated on the 
Question Whether Bonuses Would Continue Beyond 2002. 
Summit contends (Brief at pp. 28-29) that Mr. Carvelas has failed to rebut the 
presumption that the parties intended to replace prior or contemporaneous oral 
agreements with the written Employment Agreement. In support of this contention, 
Summit asserts (Brief at p. 29) that "[Mr.] Carvelas does not dispute that he entered into 
the Employment Agreement which specifically provides for contingent bonuses only 
through 2002. Instead, he offers evidence of what he describes as contemporaneous 
agreements to pay bonuses past 2002." Yet, as we show below, the premise of 
Summit's argument - that Mr. Carvelas agrees that the Agreement provides for the 
payment of bonuses only through 2002 - is erroneous. 
Summit's reliance on this Court's decision in Novell Inc. v. Canopy Group, Inc., 
2004 UT App. 162, f 15, 92 P.3d 768, 773 (Utah Ct. App. 2004), is misplaced. In 
Novell, the agreement at issue addressed the payment of royalties, including a 
percentage of recoveries from civil actions, but did not provide for the deduction of 
attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, Canopy argued that the agreement was not fully 
integrated on the issue of payment of royalties and that the parties entered into 
contemporaneous oral agreements concerning calculation of the royalty base. The Court 
rejected that argument, concluding that the agreement was fully integrated on that issue 
and that Canopy had failed to produce evidence to overcome the presumption of 
integration. 2004 UT App. at ffif 4, 10-14, 92 P.3d at 771-73. 
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By contrast, as we made clear in our principal Brief (at pp. 21-23), the record 
here shows that the Employment Agreement was only partially integrated on the issue of 
payment of bonuses. As the Court stated in Novell "parol evidence to prove the part not 
reduced to writing is admissible, although it is not admissible as to the part reduced to 
writing." 2004 UT App. 162, \ 15, 92 P.3d 768, 773 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (citation 
omitted). Here, unlike the situation presented in Novell, Mr. Carvelas does not seek to 
introduce evidence of how bonuses would be calculated for the years specified in the 
Agreement but, instead, seeks to introduce evidence concerning an issue as to which the 
Agreement is completely silent - whether bonuses would be paid after the years 
specified in the Agreement and, if so, at what rate. Accordingly, whether the integration 
clause contained in the Agreement applies to the "subject matter" described as payment 
of bonuses through 2002, or, as Summit would urge, as payment of bonuses throughout 
the entire employment relationship, is a question of fact for the jury to resolve. See, e.g., 
Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc., 804 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
3. Extrinsic Evidence Helps Resolve the Ambiguity Reflected in 
the Employment Agreement As to Whether Bonuses Would Be 
Paid After 2002. 
Summit asserts (Brief at p. 29) that the evidence presented by Mr. Carvelas is 
irrelevant to a determination whether the bonuses would be paid after 2002. As we 
show below, Summit is wrong. 
As we made clear in our principal Brief (at pp. 23-26), even if the Agreement 
were integrated on the issue of payment of bonuses, extrinsic evidence concerning the 
11 
parties' intent at the time of contracting is nonetheless admissible to clarify whether 
bonuses would be paid after 2002 because the Agreement, by its silence, creates an 
ambiguity on that issue. See, e.g., Novell, 2004 UT Ap. 162, Tf 15 n. 3, 92 P.3d at 773; 
WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Service Corp., 2002 UT 88, % 22, 54 P.3d 1139, 1145 
(Utah 2002). Indeed, in light of the Agreement's silence on that issue, it is clearly 
susceptible of reasonable alternative interpretations yielding contrary conclusions. See, 
e.g., Nielsen, 2000 UT 37, fflf 8-10, 78 P.3d at 602-03. Accordingly, the Court may 
consider the testimony of Mr. Carvelas as well as the parties' actions and performance 
as evidence of their true intentions. See, e.g., Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State 
Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted). 
Contrary to Summit's assertion (Brief at p. 25), the record reflects substantial 
evidence as to the parties' intent "beyond [Mr. Carvelas'] allegations that he understood 
he would receive bonuses after 2002." In fact, the record shows that, at the time of 
contracting, Mr. La Haye represented to Mr. Carvelas in January 2003 that bonuses 
would continue at 20% of his salary beyond 2002; and that, in fact, Summit paid 
Mr. Carvelas a bonus equal to 20% of his salary in 2003. Thus, on the record before the 
Court on appeal, and taking all facts in a light most favorable to Mr. Carvelas and 
drawing all justifiable inferences in his favor, as we must, a reasonable jury could 
conclude that the parties intended bonuses to continue beyond 2002 and that such 
bonuses would be calculated using the methodology set forth in the Employment 
Agreement. See WebBank, 2002 UT 88, ^  22, 54 P.3d at 1145. 
12 
B. Even If Extrinsic Evidence Did Not Establish the Parties9 Original 
Intent, an Implied-In-Fact Contract Was Established That Required 
Summit To Pay Bonuses To Mr. Carvelas Beyond 2002. 
Summit asserts (Brief at pp. 29-30) that the issue whether, by application of 
implied-in-fact contract principles, an agreement to pay bonuses beyond 2002 was 
formed is not properly before the Court; and, even if were, that the record does not 
reflect evidence sufficient from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the parties 
manifested such an intent. Again, Summit is wrong on both points. As we show below, 
(1) the question whether Mr. Carvelas' claim for breach of contract is supported by 
application of implied-in-fact contract principles is properly before this Court on appeal; 
and (2) a reasonable jury could concluded, based on the parties' statements and course 
of conduct, that an implied-in-fact contract was formed that obligated Summit to 
continue to pay bonuses to Mr. Carvelas beyond 2002. 
1. The Question Whether Mr. Carvelas' Claim for Breach of 
Contract Is Supported by Application of Implied-in-Fact 
Contract Principles Is Properly Before this Court on Appeal. 
Summit contends (Brief at pp. 29-30) that Mr. Carvelas' argument that, by 
application of implied-in-fact contract principles, Summits was obligated to pay him 
bonuses after 2002 is not properly before this Court on appeal because he did not 
identify the applicability of those principles in his Complaint. This contention is less 
than colorable. 
Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the general pleading 
requirements, stating that a complaint "shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of 
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the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). This 
rule is designed to provide notice of the nature of the claims asserted against a defendant 
and an opportunity to meet those claims. Cowley v. Slone, 127 P.3d 1224, 1231 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2005); Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). Rule 
8(f) provides that "all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 8(f). The fundamental purpose of these rules is to "liberalize both pleading 
and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the privilege of presenting 
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute." Cheney v. 
Pucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963).3 
3
 See also Cowley, 127 P.3d at 1232 (citing Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 
2003 UT 14,124, 70 P.3d 35 (holding that the failure to plead fraud with particularity was 
not fatal where the defendant had notice and an opportunity to respond); MotivatedMgmt. 
InVl v. Finney, 604 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1979) (holding, under rule 54(c)(1), that the 
plaintiffs complaint was not defective, even though it sought to foreclose a lien that on 
appeal the plaintiff conceded was invalid, because the complaint also sought a judgment for 
money damages against the defendants); PLC Landscape Constr. v. Piccadilly Fish (N 
Chips, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 350,502 P.2d 562,563 (1972) (holding that the trial court properly 
allowed recovery on the basis of quantum meruit, even though the complaint sought relief 
on the basis of an express contract, because the defendant was not "denied a fair 
opportunity to meet the change in theory of recovery"); Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 
Utah 2d 226,310 P.2d 517,519-20 (1957) (holding that the trial court properly considered 
the issue of partnership, although it was not formally raised by the pleadings, because both 
parties presented evidence on the issue at trial); Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 
44, % 6 n.2,19 P.3d 1005 (holding that the trial court properly ordered the appellant to repay 
funds misappropriated from his children's custodial accounts, even though that issue was 
not raised in the pleadings, because he "had the opportunity to prepare and meet the issue"); 
Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 275-76 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) (rejecting argument that the trial court impermissibly granted relief on a theory not 
pleaded where the defendant had notice and an opportunity to respond); Henderson v. For-
Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465, 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding that trial court properly 
considered an overcharge claim, despite the fact that it was not formally raised in the 
(continued...) 
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Here, as Summit notes (Brief at p. 30), Mr. Carvales' Complaint in fact did state 
a claim for breach of contract. In his Complaint, Mr. Carvelas quoted and cited each of 
the provisions of the Employment Agreement set forth above and then alleged that 
Summit "failed to pay any of the bonus due to Mr. Carvelas under the foregoing 
provisions for the year 2004, which, based on Mr. Carvelas' salary at that time of 
$100,000, resulted in an unpaid bonus of $20,000 due and owing under the Employment 
Agreement." Rec. at 5 (Complaint at p. 5, % 16). Mr. Carvelas did not specify whethei 
this allegation was based on the express terms of the Employment Agreement or based 
on application of the terms of the Employment Agreement beyond its specified years. 
Then, in Count I of his Complaint, Mr. Carvelas included all of his claims for breach of 
contract and incorporated each of the preceding paragraphs of his Complaint, alleging 
that he and Summit are parties to an agreement under which Summit agreed to pay 
bonuses to Mr. Carvelas in accordance with the terms set forth in the Agreement; and 
that Summit breached the parties' agreement by failing to pay bonuses as the parties had 
agreed. Rec. at 7 (Complaint at p. 7, fflf 26, 27). Summit's only contention is that the 
Complaint does not, as part of his claim for breach of contract, refer to implied-in-fact 
contract principles as the basis for his claim for breach of the parties' agreement that 
Summit would pay Mr. Carvelas' bonuses beyond the years specified in the Agreement. 
3(...continued) 
pleadings, because the appellant failed to show it was prejudiced by consideration of the 
claim)). 
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Summit's contention, however, is a mere quibble, signifying nothing. Given 
each of the allegations that we note above, Summit cannot legitimately contend that it 
has been denied notice and an opportunity to meet Mr. Carvelas' claim for breach of 
contract. To support his claim for breach of contract, Mr. Carvelas must prove the 
following elements: (1) formation of a contract; (2) performance by him; (3) breach by 
Summit; and (4) damages. E.g., Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, f^ 14, 20 
P.3d 388, 392 (citation omitted). Implied-in-fact contract principles, in turn, are 
applicable simply as a way to determine whether Mr. Carvelas can establish the first of 
these elements. E.g., Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1991); 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1044, 1052 (Utah 1989). To satisfy this 
burden, Mr. Carvelas must show that, although there was no express contract provision 
to this effect, the parties nevertheless expressed an intent to be bound to an agreement. 
Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1001; Berube, 111 P.2d at 1044, 1052; see also Kirberg v. West 
One Bank, 872 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted) (quoted in Wood v. 
Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 2001 UT App. 35, % 14, 19 P.3d 392, 397 (Utah Ct. App. 
2001)). The allegations of Mr. Carvelas' breach of contract thus encompass implied-in-
fact contract principles merely as one way to establish the first element of that claim. 
See Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1001; Berube, 111 P.2d at 1044, 1052. 
Furthermore, not only did the allegations of the Complaint thus put Summit on 
notice of Mr. Carvelas' claim for breach of contract, however the individual elements of 
that claim may be proved, but, here, the applicability of the implied-in-fact principles 
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was raised and addressed in connection with the motion now before this Court on 
appeal. In fact, in his Memorandum filed below in opposition to Summit's motion for 
summary judgment, Mr. Carvleas specifically asserted that a contract was formed by 
application of implied-in-fact principles. Rec. at 83-84. Then, in its Reply 
Memorandum, Summit specifically responded to the arguments raised by Mr. Carvelas 
that the first element of his claim for breach of contract was established by application 
of those principles. Rec. at 118-19. Accordingly, it is clear that Summit had full notice 
and an opportunity to respond to Mr. Carvelas' arguments concerning the applicability 
of those principles and can point to no prejudice that would result from the trial court's 
consideration of those arguments. See, e.g., Cowley, 127 P.3d at 1232-33. Indeed, it is 
difficult to give any credence to Summit's protest, given that Summit filed its motion, 
and received the opposition addressing the applicability of implied-in-fact contract 
principles before discovery even began. 
Against all this, Summit relies (Brief at p. 29) on the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, f^ 29, 84 P.2d 1154, 
1161-62. Yet, the circumstances presented in Grand Canyon are unlike the situation 
presented here. In Grand Canyon, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the 
plaintiffs claim for punitive damages was not properly before the Court on appeal 
because punitive damages are recoverable only in tort and the plaintiff had not raised 
any tort claim in the trial court. By contrast, Mr. Carvelas set forth a claim for breach of 
contract and, in so doing, also identified each elements of his claim, the first of which, 
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as we note above, could be proven by application of implied-in-fact contract principles. 
Morever, the same set of operative facts that support Mr. Carvelas' argument above that, 
by consideration of extrinsic evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Summit 
agreed, as part of the Employment Agreement, to pay him bonuses under the terms set 
forth in the Agreement beyond 2002 likewise apply to his argument that, by application 
of implied-in-fact principles, Summit manifested an intent to make that same agreement. 
This case is also entirely unlike the situation presented in Wright v. Univ. of 
Utah, 876 P.2d 380, 386 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), also cited by Summit (Brief at p. 29), in 
which this Court concluded, among other things, that the trial court had properly 
dismissed the plaintiffs claims pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because the 
plaintiffs claim, which alleged that an employee of a governmental entity "assaulted 
and struck" her, was barred under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2). In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that, due to the actor's mental 
state, he could not form the requisite intent to commit the intentional acts of assault and 
battery that were barred by governmental immunity, because the plaintiff had only 
pleaded intentional conduct and not unintentional conduct in her complaint. By 
contrast, as we have seen, implied-in-fact contract principles are applicable here merely 
to establish the first element of Mr. Carvelas' claim for breach of contract, not to offer 
some distinct and different theory. 
Finally, neither of the decisions cited by Summit involved the situation presented 
here, in which the defendant has had full notice and an opportunity to respond to the 
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plaintiffs arguments concerning applicability of legal principles to claims that were 
clearly plead in the Complaint. Given that, if this case were remanded to the District 
Court, Summit will have every opportunity to explore the applicability of such 
principles to Mr. Carvelas' breach of contract claim, Summit's assertion that the issue 
cannot be considered and decided now is somewhat baffling. 
2. A Reasonable Jury Could Conclude, Based on the Parties' 
Statements and Course of Conduct, that an Implied-In-Fact 
Contract Was Formed that Obligated Summit to Continue to 
Pay Bonuses to Mr. Carvelas Beyond 2002. 
Not only did Mr. La Haye represent to Mr. Carvelas, both while they were 
negotiating the Agreement and again in January 2003, that Summit would continue to 
pay him bonuses but, in 2003, Summit actually paid him a bonus equal to 20% of his 
base salary. In these circumstances, a reasonable jury could conclude that Summit, by 
its statements and course of conduct, manifested an intent to pay Mr. Carvelas' bonuses 
after 2002. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P.2d 331, 334 (Utah 1992); 
Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 57 (Utah 1991); Francisconi v. Union Pac. 
R.R., 2001 UT App. 350, f 14, 36 P.3d 999, 1002, 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 2001); Wood, 
2001 UT App. 35,f 14, 19 P.3d at 398 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
Summit, with no discussion, concludes (Brief at p. 30) that this result is 
inappropriate because the Employment Agreement contains a clause that prohibits 
modification of the Agreement. Yet, the Agreement states merely that "[a]ny waiver, 
modification, or amendment of any provision of this Agreement shall be effective only 
if in writing in a document that specifically refers to this Agreement and such document 
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is signed by the parties hereto." Rec. at 96 (Employment Agreement at p. 9, f 12). By 
contrast, the implied-in-fact contract that was created here addresses an issue as to 
which the written Employment Agreement contains no provision at all but is entirely 
silent. As a consequence, the implied contract that was formed after the terms of the 
Employment Agreement had become of no effect then resulted in no waiver, 
modification or amendment of any provision of the Agreement. 
Ill- A REASONABLE FINDER OF FACT COULD CONCLUDE THAT 
SUMMIT BREACHED ITS EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT WITH 
MR. CARVELAS BY FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE 
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS TO WHICH THE PARTIES HAD 
AGREED. 
Summit asserts (Brief at pp. 31-35) that, by delivering a written notice to 
Mr. Carvelas stating that his employment with Summit was terminated "without cause," 
Summit adhered to the procedural requirements set forth in the Employment Agreement 
that required Summit to state the "grounds" for his termination. In reality, Summit's 
argument shows that the term, "grounds," is in fact susceptible of more than one 
reasonable interpretation. Indeed, citing Black's Law Dictionary - which defines 
"grounds" as "[a] foundation or basis; points relied on" - Summit asserts that, by stating 
that the termination was "without cause," Summit in fact stated the foundation or basis 
and points upon which it relied. Yet, a more persuasive interpretation of that 
requirement, and one that is at least equally as plausible, is that, to state the "foundation 
or basis, points relied on," Summit was required to state the reason, foundation, basis, or 
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points upon which it relied in deciding to make the decision to terminate Mr. Carvelas 
"without cause." 
Contrary to Summit's assertion (Brief at pp. 34-35), this result actually gives 
meaning to all of the provisions of the Employment Agreement. Indeed, by equating the 
requirement to state the grounds for a termination with stating merely that the 
termination was without cause, Summit's asks us to take away any meaning from the 
separate and distinct requirement to state a "grounds therefore." Such a tautological 
interpretation violates the well-established rule of contract interpretation to consider 
each contract provision in relation to all others, "with a view toward giving effect to all 
and ignoring none," Jones v. ERA Brokers Console 2000 UT 61, % 12, 6 P.3d 1129 
(Utah 2000). 
Against all this, Summit argues (Brief at pp. 33-35) that requiring it to state a 
reason for the termination would be contrary to the at-will nature of the employment 
relationship. To be sure, as Summit notes (Brief at p. 34), "at will" employment, as 
defined by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, allows an employer to discharge an 
employee for any reason at all. E.g., Uintah Basin Medical Ctr. v. Hardy, 2005 UT 
App. 92, t 16, 110 P.3d 168, 173 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). Yet, as we made clear in our 
principal Brief (at pp.29-30), an at-will relationship is a bundle of rights, any of which 
an employer may surrender; and, in this case, the right that Summit relinquished was the 
ability to terminate Mr. Carvelas without cause unless Summit provided a written notice 
of termination that also stated the reason or grounds for the termination. See, e.g., 
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Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 307 (Utah 1992) (emphasis 
added). In the end, Summit could still terminate Mr. Carvelas for any at all but, 
pursuant to the Employment Agreement, was merely obligated to inform Mr. Carvelas 
of that reason. Thus, the requirement to provide a written notice and, in that notice, to 
state a reason simply did not result in a conflict with Summit's ability to terminate for 
any reason, so long as Summit met those procedural requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee 
Summit. Each of Mr. Carvelas5 claims presents genuine issues of material fact that 
preclude summary judgment and require resolution by a finder of fact. Accordingly, the 
Court should remand this case to the District Court, require the District Court to permit 
the discovery process to proceed, and allow the case to be resolved on the merits 
following an exploration of the actual facts. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Gregory W. Stevens 
Dated: May 18,2006 Attorney for Appellant 
22 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, this 18th day of May 2006, I served two copies of the 
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant, by first class mail, postage prepaid, on the 
following counsel: 
Attorneys for the Appellee: 
John A. Beckstead, Esquire 
Snell & Wilmer 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1004 
Gregory W. Stevens 
